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Introduction 
 
There has been a recent notable growth of interest in the topic of 
gratitude in philosophy, psychology and education and other fields. 
(For, example, in philosophy, Berger, 1975; Card, 1988; Walker, 
1988; McConnell, 1993; Fitzgerald, 1998; Wellman, 1999; 
Roberts, 2004; McAleer, 2012; Carr, 2013; Gulliford, Morgan & 
Kristjánsson, 2013; Kristjánsson, 2015; Carr, 2015: in psychology, 
McCullough, Kilpatrick, Emmons & Larson, 2001; Emmons & 
McCullough, 2004; Bartlett & DeSteno 2006; Watkins, 2013; 
Froh, Bono, Fan, Emmons, Henderson, Harris, Leggio & Wood, 
2014: and in education, White, 1999; Howells, 2012).  To be sure, 
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given that the terms ‘please’ and ‘thank you’ are, at least in some 
cultures, among the first to be learned, gratitude does seem to be a 
fundamental dimension of human association or social 
reciprocation. Moreover, as the slightest acquaintance with above 
cited philosophical and psychological literature soon shows, 
gratitude has invariably also been regarded as a personal and social 
benefit of some moral significance. 
 
In this light, one might hold that teaching the young to be grateful 
or at least to understand the meaning of gratitude should be a 
parental and/or other educational priority. If gratitude is a basic 
facet of positive human development, a building block of civilised 
human association, or – like requirements to be honest or fair – a 
moral obligation, we may well consider it an educational duty to 
encourage or require some inclination on the part of the young to 
respond gratefully to favours or benefits.  Indeed, this is probably 
no more nor less than what good parents and teachers have always 
sought to foster on the part of those in their parental and/or 
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educational care. That said, the question of what form such 
education might or should take is complex and the purpose of this 
paper is to identify and explore such complexities. As a prelude to 
this, however, we may first look at attempts that have to date been 
made – mainly by psychologists – to understand, promote or assist 
the learning of gratitude.     
 
Recent attempts to promote gratitude 
 
Recent psychological interest in gratitude has been mainly inspired 
by a widely influential movement of ‘positive psychology’ that has 
done much to foster a contemporary shift in educational policy and 
practice away from narrow focus on academic achievement and 
certification towards broader aspects of educational development 
including the cultivation of so-called ‘character strengths’ (see, for 
example, Seligman, Ernst, Gillham, Reivich & Linkins, 2009; 
Waters, 2012).  In this context, gratitude has been linked to a range 
of psychological social and other benefits, including feelings of 
 4 
personal wellbeing and life satisfaction (Watkins, Woodward, 
Stone & Kolts, 2003; Wood, Joseph & Maltby, 2008), pro-social 
dispositions (Emmons & McCullough, 2003; Bartlett & DeSteno, 
2006) and better interpersonal relationships (Algoe, 2012; Bartlett, 
Condon, Cruz, Baumann & DeSteno, 2012). Of some present 
interest, research has also claimed to show that boosting gratitude 
may increase satisfaction with school experience (Froh, Sefick & 
Emmons, 2008). Indeed, development and deployment of 
gratitude-boosting interventions in educational contexts has 
increased in recent years – especially in the USA and Australia 
where positive education has been widely influential (see, for 
example, Froh and colleagues, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2011, 2014; 
Waters 2011). Typically, the purpose of such interventions – which 
usually include counting blessings, creating gratitude 
diaries/journals, and going on gratitude visits – is to increase focus 
on gratitude and the frequency of grateful experience, sometimes 
with the aim of generating such positive psychological benefits as 
increased well-being (Froh et al. 2009; Waters 2011).  
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In one of the earliest and best known of such interventions, 
Emmons and McCullough (2003) examined the effects on adults of 
counting blessings, either once a week for ten weeks (Study 1), or 
once a day for two weeks (Study 2). The research team 
demonstrated how such gratitude exercises lead participants to 
more positive appraisals of their lives; to greater optimism about 
the week ahead; to fewer physical complaints; to improved pro-
social attitudes and behaviour; to enhanced positive affect; and to 
reduced negative affect. Indeed, in the wake of such research, 
gratitude exercises have been introduced into school curricula.  For 
example, Froh and colleagues (Froh, Sefick & Emmons, 2008) 
have implemented a range of ‘gratitude interventions’ in the USA 
that have included – alongside counting blessings – the writing and 
delivering of thank-you letters (Froh, Kashdan, Ozimkowski & 
Miller, 2009) and attempts to teach children to think gratefully via 
social-cognitive appraisals of benefit exchange (Froh et al., 2014, 
p. 132). Such educational interventions have also been held to 
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produce such psychological and social benefits as increase in self-
reported life satisfaction and wellbeing – including reduction of 
negative affect.   
 
More recently, however, such approaches to the promotion of 
gratitude have been specifically targeted at parents. In this regard, 
a recent work entitled Making Grateful Kids (2014) by Jeffrey 
Froh and Giacomo Bono – two of the best-known contemporary 
advocates of educational promotion of gratitude – is especially 
noteworthy for its exploration of a wide variety of practical 
interventions by which parents, teachers and others might promote 
gratitude among the young. Moreover, some very large claims on 
behalf of the benefits of gratitude are made by this work: thus, 
gratitude is described on the book cover as a  ‘miracle cure’ and a 
‘wonder drug’ ensuring that children and young people will 
‘behave better, improve their grades and avoid risky behaviours’. 
Still, these various psychological approaches clearly raise 
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questions concerning the educational significance and value of 
such interventions, to which we may now turn. 
 
The educational significance of gratitude 
 
Insofar, the overall drift of such psychological literature seems to 
be that the practice of gratitude has a range of psycho-social 
benefits and that these stand to be promoted or cultivated via the 
regular practice of gratitude or developing a habit of thanksgiving.  
On the face of it, it seems supposed that gratitude may be 
developed or habituated by regular practice in much the same way 
as musical or a sporting skill. (It is here worth noting that a skill-
focused model of virtue acquisition has been much pressed in some 
contemporary Aristotelian literature of virtue ethics: see, for 
example, Annas, 2011.) However, one might well wonder exactly 
what is being developed or built up in this way: in short, what 
exactly is here meant by gratitude as such?  Is gratitude a feeling of 
subjective well-being, an attitude (perhaps involving beliefs about 
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the world) or a social skill?  Perhaps it is meant to be all of these in 
psychological and/or other literature; but the precise educational 
significance or value of any of these things remains far from clear. 
 
To begin with, while it may be that gratitude involves feelings of 
subjective well-being, or is at least conducive to some positive 
affect (e.g., Gallup, 1998; Watkins et al. 2006), this would not 
alone justify its educational promotion. On a conception of 
education as crucially implicated in the promotion of knowledge 
and understanding (as, for example, pioneered in modern times by 
Peters, 1966) experiencing such affect would seem neither 
necessary nor sufficient for educational significance: clearly, what 
is emotionally congenial need not be educational and what is 
educational is often not emotionally congenial. Much the same 
might also apply to gratitude conceived only as a positive or 
optimistic attitude or outlook on the world, or a ‘life orientation’ 
(see, for example, Wood et al. 2010), since this by itself would 
also not serve to show whether such a state is an educationally 
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significant one to be in.  In short, for a psychological state to be of 
educational value, more would need to be said about the reasons 
why it is so valuable, than that it is a pleasant one to be in. On the 
other hand, any suggestion that gratitude is a pro-social skill – that 
it conduces to better interpersonal association – might seem more 
educationally promising. But, again, questions need to be asked 
about the precise educational significance of such skills (since it is 
not obvious that all of these, such as good manners, have large 
educational significance) – perhaps especially about whether any 
general disposition to gratitude invariably conduces to the right 
sort of social relations, or what might or should be regarded as 
appropriate social or other gratitude.   
 
Evidently, many of these questions – about the appropriateness of 
grateful feelings or dispositions – are clearly pointing in a 
normative direction.  In this regard, it may also be conceded that 
most psychologists and philosophers have regarded gratitude as not 
only personally and socially beneficial, but also as of some moral 
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significance. Moreover, while this view seems more frequently 
assumed by psychologists than argued for, there are nevertheless 
honourable attempts in in the psychological literature to give this 
claim some normative substance. Thus, for example, Michael 
McCullough and colleagues (McCullough, Kilpatrick, Emmons & 
Larson, 2001; see also McCullough & Tsang, 2004) have argued 
that gratitude has a three-fold function as a moral barometer, as a 
moral motivator and as a moral reinforcer: in short, gratitude is 
held to be a gauge of agents’ moral appreciation, and a disposition 
that tends towards as well as magnifying such tendency towards 
moral agency. Insofar, might this not provide a case for the 
teaching of gratitude to children and young people in schools or 
other educational contexts?  Might we not feel as compelled or 
morally obligated to teach young people to be grateful as we would 
in instructing or encouraging them to be more honest, fair or 
tolerant? 
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The trouble now, however, is that the claims of McCullough and 
others for the moral significance or implications of gratitude are far 
from clear or straightforward. To begin with, they seem based on 
little more than the observation that gratitude has interpersonal or 
pro-social benefits.  But, of course, such social or interpersonal 
benefits – no less than benefits measured in terms of subjective 
wellbeing – could yet fall short of moral significance or value.  For 
just as activities conducive to feelings of subjective well being 
might be amoral or even immoral, it could be that activities 
productive of social or interpersonal attachment also failed to serve 
moral ends.  Indeed, it may be that much injustice has followed in 
human affairs from too much (tribal or other) attachment as too 
little. Moreover, even if we do conceive the ends that gratitude 
serves – as a moral motivator or reinforcer – as morally significant, 
it would by no means follow that gratitude would qualify as a 
moral end or quality in and of itself.  Aside from this falling short 
of showing what moral value gratitude might have in its own right, 
it seems that anything that served the moral ends to which 
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gratitude is directed might well be adopted instead. For example, 
we would not need gratitude to promote positive interpersonal 
relations, if (say) educating for justice or benevolence served 
equally as well.  
 
While philosophers may have been less interested than 
psychologists in questions about the learning of gratitude, they 
have been much concerned with questions of its meaning and have 
invariably taken gratitude to have some moral significance. All the 
same, there has also been much controversy over the precise moral 
character of gratitude and perhaps the key issue has turned on its 
status as a requirement or duty (For works that clearly define this 
issue, see McConnell, 1993; Wellman, 1999: see also Carr, 2013).  
The main trouble here is that while some measure of gratitude 
towards benefactors seems socially expected – and appreciating 
this parents may encourage their children to thank others for 
favours – there is yet a clear sense in which such gratitude is not 
obligatory in the manner of such moral or other obligations as 
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honesty or fairness and that benefactors therefore do not have any 
right to the thanks of those they benefit (Carr, 2015).  Indeed, in 
light of this feature of gratitude, Rousseau (cited in Watkins et al., 
2006) has been credited with observing (with perhaps 
characteristic paradox) that ‘gratitude is a duty which ought to be 
paid, but which none have a right to expect’; and Claudia Card has 
more recently remarked that ‘a duty to be grateful sounds like a 
joke’ (Card, 1988, p. 8). Thus, insofar as the favours of benefactors 
are unsolicited and freely given, while ungrateful beneficiaries 
might well appear to the giver and others to be impolite or 
graceless, it is not entirely clear that they have failed to meet any – 
certainly moral – obligation (though see McConnell, 1993 for an 
alternative argument).  
 
A related difficulty about conceiving gratitude as duty-fulfilment is 
that young people or others may well give thanks from a sense of 
obligation without being at all what we would normally regard as 
grateful. This is because being truly grateful seems more than just 
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a matter of the routine, casual or token utterances of ‘thanks’ or 
‘have a nice day’ that pepper everyday human discourse – which 
may well mean, and perhaps more often than not do mean, hardly 
much at all. In this light, genuine gratitude seems to require some 
positive attitude or sentiment of sincere appreciation either for the 
favours or gifts given, or for the generosity and good will of others 
(for example, Roberts, 2004; Wellman, 1999). But, again, such 
(perhaps dispositional or affective) gratitude may not be 
commanded or required. Indeed, requiring thanks from the young 
may well seem counter-productive if it results in discouraging the 
free expression of gratitude – much as requiring them to practice 
scales on the piano may sometimes alienate them from music.  To 
be sure, this point is not that the young should never be required to 
do or learn anything against their will: it is rather that whereas the 
aim of teaching a musical skill is to foster the ability rather than 
the inclination to perform it, the point of teaching gratitude is 
precisely to inspire pupils to want to be grateful rather than merely 
to perform grateful acts. 
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In this light, many philosophers have been drawn to conceiving 
gratitude as more a moral virtue than a duty. (see, for explicit 
defence of gratitude as a virtue, Wellman, 1999). So conceived, 
virtuous gratitude would not be just a regular tendency to express 
thanks, but an affectively grounded trait-like capacity to feel 
thankful or want to show sincere appreciation on appropriate 
occasions of benefaction. Thus, just as we should not regard agents 
as benevolent or compassionate unless they felt care or compassion 
– no matter how much or how often they contributed to charitable 
causes – so we should not consider them to be grateful people 
unless they feel grateful (though, of course, we might also require 
such feelings to show themselves in grateful action). That said, 
there is a compelling case for saying that such grateful emotion is 
neither sufficient nor necessary for genuine gratitude.  
 
First – leaving for later a significant issue about whether the 
previously considered gratitude interventions of psychologists are 
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the most effective ways of fostering any alleged virtuous gratitude 
– it is far from evident that the presence of a positive feeling or 
attitude towards others or the world is generally sufficient for 
moral virtue. Clearly, there are many affective qualities that we 
consider desirable, laudable or admirable – such as cheerfulness or 
optimism – that are not moral virtues in the manner of, say, 
honesty or justice. In this regard, it would seem to be one crucial 
difference between cheerfulness and honesty that while we might 
praise someone for possessing either of these qualities, we would 
(or could) hardly criticize a person for being gloomy as we could 
(or would) for being dishonest. But likewise, while we might 
encourage the young to be grateful, or even show some 
disapproval if they are not, they are (arguably) under no moral 
obligation to be so – and we certainly could not punish them for 
being ungrateful in the way that we might for lying or cheating. In 
this light, we might be inclined to say – not least in a spirit of 
liberal tolerance – that the gratitude or ingratitude of agents, no 
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less than their abundance or lack of cheer, is largely their own 
affair.  
 
But it is also not entirely clear that the positive affect in which 
philosophers and psychologists have sometimes sought to ground 
virtuous gratitude is necessary either. To be sure, parents may 
require young children to express or write letters of thanks for gifts 
or favours that they may not value from family, friends or relatives 
for whom they may have little or no regard – and that they may 
hate doing this.  In such cases, we might well say that they are not 
really grateful.  Still, it does not follow – perhaps in more mature 
cases – that all who thank those to whom they may not be warmly 
disposed for gifts of little value to them, should also not be 
considered genuinely or sincerely grateful. But, by much the same 
token, it is not obvious that we should count the wholehearted 
thanks of small children to those they love for presents that they 
have always wanted as virtuous gratitude either. By this light, any 
apparently thankful young child might fail to count as genuinely 
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grateful precisely insofar as she is concerned only with the 
satisfaction of her desire for a new acquisition or to express the 
love of close attachment. On the other hand, a morally mature 
adult may well count as truly and sincerely grateful – despite any 
and all negative feelings towards gift or giver – if she duly 
appreciates the kind and generous spirit in which the gift is given 
and makes a clear effort to respond in kind. To understand this 
better, we may now take a closer look – with reference to the virtue 
ethics of Aristotle – at the possible virtue ethical credentials of 
gratitude. 
 
Towards virtuous gratitude 
 
So far, any educational case for the teaching or other promotion of 
gratitude would seem to rest on conceiving gratitude as something 
like a moral virtue – in the manner, perhaps, of honesty or justice – 
of a kind that might call for educational development or formation. 
In this regard, modern work in virtue ethics – deriving mostly 
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(though not exclusively) from Aristotle (1969) – regards virtue as a 
state of character concerned, inter alia, with the practical 
cultivation of particular virtue-specific emotions that disposes 
agents to act in morally optimal ways. (Latter day work in virtue 
ethics is voluminous: but, for this fairly standard view, see Carr, 
2003). Insofar, recent psychological efforts to develop gratitude 
interventions that are productive of grateful feelings and pro-social 
conduct may seem in line with this broad goal. However, matters 
are not quite so straightforward. First, it is not clear that grateful 
sentiments, attitudes or habits are generally or inevitably of moral 
concern – in the manner of such virtues as honesty or justice. This 
is an issue to which we shall return in the last section. But 
secondly, insofar as there is more to Aristotelian virtue than the 
cultivation of pro-social habits conducive to positive psychological 
states, it far from clear how gratitude would qualify as a virtue that 
learners might require educational assistance to develop as 
required for their personal moral or other growth or flourishing – 
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again, in the manner of such time-honoured virtues as honesty, 
temperance or justice.  
 
Since the second of these issues may seem more fundamental, we 
shall here first explore the question of whether or how gratitude 
might pass muster as an educable virtue. In this regard, we have 
already noticed that a key difference between gratitude as a form 
of routine reciprocation – the result of parental encouragement of 
children to return, for example, routine thanks for favours – and 
the thanks of the putative virtuously grateful agent, is that the latter 
should be heartfelt in the light of some genuine appreciation of the 
human point, purpose and spirit of gratitude. On this score, 
contemporary neo-Aristotelian literature on the moral psychology 
of virtue evidently holds that feelings, emotions and passions are 
no less implicated in moral virtues than reason (again, for example, 
see Carr 2003). Thus, to be virtuously compassionate or generous 
is not just to feel disposed – as a matter of duty – to help or give 
time or resources to others, but also to be inspired by the attitudes 
 21 
or sentiments of the compassionate or generous agent.  Likewise, it 
might be said that to be a virtuously grateful agent, it is not enough 
to be disposed to give thanks for favours, but also requires the 
attitudes or sentiments of the grateful agent – which have often 
been identified in the academic literature with something like a 
grateful feeling or emotion of gratitude (for a stout defence of 
gratitude as an emotional disposition – a ‘concern-based construal’ 
– see Roberts 2004). We should here acknowledge that the 
gratitude on which we are mainly focusing is that directed towards 
a specific agent of benefaction (and usually called ‘triadic’ or 
benefit-triggered’ gratitude: see Carr, 2013; Gulliford et al., 2013; 
Lambert, Graham & Fincham, 2009). To be sure, gratitude has also 
been construed as a broader ‘untargeted’ attitude of appreciation of 
all good things that may come one’s way (see Fitzgerald, 1998; 
McAleer, 2012; Lambert et al., 2009; Gulliford et al., 2013). 
However, insofar as there are persuasive philosophical arguments 
against such a more grammatically relaxed conception of gratitude 
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(see, for example, Carr, 2013), we shall not explore such 
complexity further here. 
 
Still, insofar as the practical wisdom or deliberation (phronesis) 
that Aristotle (1969, book 6, section 4) regards as necessary for 
virtue is concerned with the proper ordering or regulation of 
virtuous affect – with determining the precise or appropriate 
measure or expression of such affect – there is some room for 
caution here about the way in which emotions are implicated in 
virtues. Indeed, it may be one trouble that the ‘doctrine of the 
mean’, through which Aristotle attempts to explain the role of 
affect in moral virtues, is often too simply conceived on the model 
– most commonly cited – of the relationship of courage to fear.  In 
this light, courage is usually defined as a via media between a 
vicious excess of fear (cowardice) and a no less vicious deficit of 
the same (recklessness or impetuosity). However, the difficulty of 
applying any such general account of virtue as mediating between 
excesses and defects of some particular sentiment specific to that 
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virtue were long ago exposed by Bertrand Russell’s witty reductio 
of Aristotelian justice as seeking a way between partiality and 
impartiality (Russell, 2000). That said, the joke may only really tell 
against someone mistakenly looking for some distinct feeling 
whose unjust excess is partiality and whose deficit is impartiality. 
But insofar as impartiality is not a deficit of partiality, but rather 
what justice actually means, it may simply be a mistake to seek 
any specific just feeling or emotion that the virtue of justice might 
serve to temper or moderate.  
 
Of course this is not to deny that there may be emotions that it is 
the business of justice to temper or moderate. For example, a judge 
might by nature be too sociable and inclined to see the best in 
others. But while we can see how justice might be endangered by 
complete deficit of some such agreeableness, it is no less clear how 
excess of it might incline to unjust leniency. Again, while a teacher 
who deplores the conduct of a particular pupil might be justified in 
persisting in such sentiment – perhaps in order to get the pupil to 
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behave better – she may also need to ensure that this does not 
become excessive personal dislike and/or prejudice. So while it 
may not make sense to suppose that there is any distinctive 
sentiment of justice that the virtuously just would need to control 
or moderate (it would, after all, be odd to say ‘I feel very just 
today’), there may well be a range of justice-related feelings and 
emotions between which this virtue does need to arbitrate.  
 
But what here true of justice may be no less so of gratitude.  For 
despite any and all temptation to conceive gratitude as rooted in 
the cultivation of a specific grateful feeling or emotion that may 
also require moderation in the interest of some ideal mean, it is far 
from obvious that there is any such distinct sentiment. For while 
we might make sense enough of ingratitude as a vicious deficit of 
gratitude, it is less apparent what sense might be made of an excess 
of gratitude – since, as in the case of justice, gratitude seems to be 
the normative target at which we are aiming rather than a specific 
sentiment of which we might have too much. Again, we need not 
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doubt that gratitude often does involve the negotiation or 
moderation of both positive and negative feelings or emotions (see 
Morgan, Gulliford & Carr, 2015). Thus, for example, someone 
might interpret a gift or favour from someone whom they admire 
to be more meaningful than it is and respond with inappropriate 
romantic attachment to the benefactor. While such attachment 
might be appropriate in some circumstances, it could well be 
misplaced here and therefore in need of moderating in the name of 
well-judged gratitude. However, if someone responds to a well-
intentioned gift with some disappointment, guilt or embarrassment 
(Morgan, Gulliford & Kristjansson, 2014), these may also be 
emotions or feelings that need laying aside or suppressing in the 
name of due gratitude. But while all of such – negative and 
positive – forms of affect no doubt require negotiation or 
moderation in the name of well-judged gratitude, to construe these 
as excessive or deficient forms of some specific sentiment of that 
name may be less advisable: rather, they are diverse forms of affect 
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– over-attachment or negative reaction – by which an agent may 
fail to hit the desired normative mean of gratitude.  
 
Moreover, as in the case of justice, there are clearly ways of failing 
to meet the best normative standards of virtuous gratitude that are 
not necessarily, if at all, due to the mismanagement of feeling or 
emotion. Precisely, some of these could be failures of perception or 
reason (wisdom). Thus, just as a judge may fail to discern (or not 
have access to) the evidence that clearly points to the defendant’s 
guilt, so a beneficiary might be simply mistaken about the 
questionable circumstances of some apparent benefaction. So, for 
example, a grateful beneficiary might fail to see that an apparent 
gift or favour has strings attached – that it is intended more as a 
bribe than as a free gift – or, in some cases, he or she may be 
mistaken about the true source of the benefaction.  Indeed, we do 
not need to turn to fiction for cases in which benefactors, desiring 
to remain anonymous, appoint some other agent to the task of 
benefaction. In such cases, if the beneficiary thanks the stand-in 
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benefactor – and that stand-in fails to reveal that the gift or favour 
did not come from him or her – then gratitude might seem 
misplaced, if not actually null and void, by dint of targeting the 
wrong person.  
 
To be sure, not all of these cases are clear-cut and there is much 
disagreement – especially among philosophers – over what we 
should say in some of them. Clearly, whereas some hold that we 
should not be grateful where gratitude is not to the real giver, or 
where the giver has some ulterior motive, others would no less 
firmly regard such circumstances as irrelevant just as long as we 
benefit. (Such discrepancies have emerged among the British 
public whereby 22.8% of respondents agreed/strongly agreed that 
they would be grateful, 26% neither agreed nor disagreed, and 
51.1% disagreed/strongly disagreed that they would be grateful in 
the case of an ulterior motive: see Arthur, Kristjansson, Gulliford 
& Morgan, 2015). The key point for now is that if there is a case 
for gratitude as a virtue – more especially an educable virtue – it 
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would rest on conceiving it as not just a matter of habitual 
thanksgiving of possible psychological or social benefit, but as a 
considered response in which there are rules and standards for its 
appropriate expression, allowing for the possibility of getting 
things wrong as well as getting them right.  Insofar, the cultivation 
of virtuous gratitude precisely requires the development of that 
capacity for deliberation and judgement that Aristotle (1969, book 
6, section 4) long identified as phronesis or practical wisdom. In 
such terms, virtuous gratitude is precisely a matter of the ordering 
of an agent’s cognitive, affective and desiderative life in 
accordance with some deliberative ideal of appropriate thanks 
giving. (For this conception of virtue in general, see Carr 2009; for 
its application to gratitude, see Morgan & Gulliford, 2014; 
Morgan, Gulliford & Carr, 2015). Just as practical wisdom is 
needed for the proper conduct of honesty or justice – for ensuring 
that we are not blinded to truth or fairness by error or biased 
attachment – so it would be needed for gratitude, so that we are not 
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ungrateful when we ought not to be, or mistakenly grateful where 
such gratitude is not warranted. 
 
Still, so conceived, it is at least arguable that gratitude may count 
not only as a virtue, but as a teachable virtue. In such terms, it 
might qualify as a virtue alongside honesty, justice, temperance, 
courage and generosity insofar as it contributes – in something like 
the manner of other virtues – to what we should and generally do 
regard as a flourishing and/or admirable human life. To be clear, 
such gratitude would be more than a trait of personality or 
temperament such as cheerfulness or good humour: for, while we 
may praise or admire such traits in others, we do not necessarily 
praise these as moral or other achievements – and we are even less 
likely to blame others for failure to exhibit such qualities. On the 
other hand, we do often commend or admire the grateful for their 
gratitude and we also in some measure criticize the ungrateful for 
their lack of it.  It also seems that we praise virtuous gratitude – or 
gratitude freely given – for much the same reason that we praise 
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the other virtues of honesty, justice, courage, self-control or 
generosity: precisely, because – while we have seen that gratitude 
is not a matter of strict obligation in the manner of justice – this 
and other virtues do require a degree of civilised self-discipline 
that may sometimes run counter to our less pro-social inclinations.  
So, just as we may be tempted to lie to our own advantage, take 
more than our due of common goods, or fail to stand our ground, 
so we may often gracelessly fail to acknowledge the contributions 
of others to our fortunes and successes. But this may also be why 
any teaching of virtuous gratitude cannot logically be prised apart 
– as some have sought to separate it (see Wellman, 1999) – from 
the grasp of the ‘quasi-obligatory’ character of gratitude.  From the 
outset, learning the grammar of gratitude or what gratitude means, 
as in the case of honesty, fairness and courage, is learning that we 
are at least invited – if not compelled – to exercise even when or 
where it is uncongenial or inconvenient. Still, we yet need to give 
some attention to a remaining puzzle about the precise moral status 
of any such virtuous gratitude.  
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The moral status of gratitude revisited 
 
Whatever the good news so far for gratitude as a learnable virtue, 
an earlier question about its precise moral status – indicated, but 
postponed, at the beginning of the last section – remains to be 
addressed. For there we suggested that in order to make a clear 
case for its educational requirement, we might need to show that 
gratitude is a matter of moral significance or concern in the 
manner of such values and virtues of honesty and justice.  But have 
we not clearly demonstrated the fundamental moral status of 
gratitude by arguing that it seems to be something like a virtue in 
the manner of justice or honesty that we may be praised for 
exhibiting and criticized for lacking?  Unfortunately, matters are 
again not so simple. To begin with, while agents who act 
dishonestly or unjustly may thereby act immorally, this is less 
evidently so of those who are ungrateful. The main reason for this, 
already noticed, is that insofar as no one is actually obliged to give 
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thanks for gifts or favours – which as such are freely and 
unconditionally given – honesty and justice are morally required in 
a way that gratitude is not. So while those who fail to be grateful 
for gifts and favours may be counted ungracious, unkind or uncivil, 
it seems less appropriate to call them immoral. Insofar, it is at least 
arguable that there is no requirement to be grateful in order to be 
moral.  
 
However, if gratitude is not necessary for morality, it would not 
appear sufficient either. For it seems that people may be sincerely, 
wholeheartedly and consummately grateful for gifts or favours in 
circumstances of utter moral corruption or exploitation – in which, 
indeed, the grateful may be fully aware of such corruption and 
exploitation (Carr, 2015; also Shelton, 2004). We have only to 
think here of the gratitude of those in receipt of large inheritances 
based on profits from the slave trade or other colonial exploitation, 
or of gang members who are grateful to colleagues for killing off 
some serious rival in dubious gangland enterprises. We need not 
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for a moment doubt that such gratitude is entirely sincere and 
genuine, or suppose that insofar as it is immorally implicated it 
cannot count as real gratitude.  Indeed, the ‘paradox’ here is that 
one might at one and the same time morally deplore the 
circumstances in which such gratitude is expressed and yet honour 
mobsters for being grateful – or, perhaps, deplore their ingratitude 
– regardless of the morally shadowy nature of what they are 
grateful for (Carr, 2015; Shelton, 2004). 
 
To be sure, while this may seem ethically odd or anomalous, it is 
actually far from uniquely so. For do we not also admire the 
courage or bravery of master criminals – or evil villains of fictional 
narratives – who will face every danger and discomfort in order to 
pursue their wicked ends (Scarfe, 2010)? In fact, it is a notable 
feature of much narrative literature that we will often find 
(especially romantic) villains admirable for their qualities of 
character, even when we well know that they are up to no good. 
Thus, reading Paradise Lost, we may well admire Satan for his 
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courage, his commitment to his wicked cause, his steadfast refusal 
to submit to the will of others, his loyalty to his followers – even 
his gratitude to those followers – even though we find his 
deliberate attempts to corrupt Adam and Eve morally 
reprehensible. Indeed, while we regard Satan’s project as 
completely devious and unjust, it is no less clear that it is also 
prosecuted with a fearless honesty, even with a certain sense of 
injustice about his plight.  But, of course, having a sense of justice 
may yet fall short of being just. 
 
That said, to doubt that virtues such as courage and gratitude are 
inherently moral in the sense of honesty or justice is not at all to 
deny that they are personal and social qualities of considerable 
significance that are importantly constitutive of human well-being 
and flourishing.  Perhaps what the above consideration might make 
us more sensitive to is that courage, self-control, gratitude and 
other personal and social virtues need to shaped and guided by 
such moral virtues as honesty and justice to the end of moral 
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flourishing.  Moreover, it should be noticed that while virtues such 
as courage or temperance may (though not necessarily) be 
conceived as primarily self-regarding virtues, a virtue such as 
gratitude would appear to be essentially other-regarding (if not 
always to all comers). Thus, as in the case of honesty and fair 
dealing, parents and teachers may be quick to insist that children 
and young people are mindful of the function of gratitude as a form 
of positive pro-social reciprocation. In short, while gratitude may 
not be inherently moral, it may well count as a significant social 
virtue that it is generally desirable for agents to possess insofar 
humans are characteristically – not least on an Aristotelian view – 
social animals. But having appreciated both this and that genuine 
or virtuous gratitude cannot merely be a matter of routine 
expression of thanks, but requires – along with such other virtues 
as honesty, justice and courage – some capacity for deliberation on 
the whys and wherefores of appropriate thanksgiving, do we not 
now have a clear case for the education of virtuous gratitude? 
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To be sure, we are finally inclined to a generally affirmative 
answer to this question. That said, observations lately made about 
the way in which educating gratitude should go also clearly raise 
problems for some of the recent gratitude initiatives and 
interventions of positive psychologists, whose claims for these 
have been prone to some morally and educationally controversial 
advocacy.  To begin with, whatever its benefits as an interpersonal 
attitude or disposition, it is not clear why gratitude in particular 
should be an especial priority in the upbringing and education of 
the young. Thus, despite psychological rhetoric (following the 
Stoic philosopher Cicero) about gratitude as the ‘parent of the 
virtues’ (McCullough & Tsang, 2004) – which fails to explain how 
a social virtue such as gratitude might engender such moral virtues 
as honesty and justice – it is far from clear that it has any higher 
priority in human affairs than such other virtues as honesty, 
fairness, compassion, generosity or forgiveness.  Moreover, from a 
moral viewpoint, there may be real dangers in encouraging parents: 
to ‘help children regulate negative emotions by being a calm 
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problem solver, by labelling and validating their emotions, and by 
replacing their negative thoughts with positive ones’ (Froh & 
Bono, 2014, p. 20). For while recognising the potential value of 
‘cognitive reframing’, any general advice to ‘move quickly past 
negative events’ (Froh & Bono, 2014, p. 28) may not always be 
well-advised, and – from a moral viewpoint – young people might 
rather be encouraged to learn to cope with negative emotions (even 
if what psychologists term ‘negative emotions’ are always 
appropriately so-called) rather than evade them. Indeed, such more 
moral pro-social emotions or virtues as sympathy and compassion 
may be slower to develop if children are encouraged to make 
‘downward social comparisons’ – that is, making contrasts with 
others who are less fortunate than themselves – as a means of 
boosting their own grateful sense of wellbeing (Froh & Bono, 
2014, pp. 25-26; and 159 f). 
 
But the strongest objection to any school deployment of the 
gratitude interventions of psychologists is that these are not very 
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obviously educational. Insofar as the attitudes and commitments of 
a virtuously grateful character are matters of rational engagement 
they require the reason-responsive practical deliberations of 
phronesis or practical wisdom that we earlier identified as a key 
ingredient of any genuine virtue. This being so, the primary 
educational task is surely not the prescriptive one of making 
children globally or ‘indiscriminately’ grateful, but – especially in 
the light of the more morally anomalous aspects and implications 
of this notion – of encouraging reflection on the meaning of 
gratitude and discerning its appropriateness in this or that 
circumstance (Morgan et al., 2015). In this regard, while we have 
noticed some more recent and welcome psychological interest in 
promoting understandings of gratitude (Froh & Bono, 2014; Froh 
et al., 2014), it may also be asked whether this goes quite far 
enough. Thus, while Froh and Bono suggest that schools might or 
should help children to ‘think gratefully’ by reflecting on gratitude 
related appraisals, their emphasis on appreciating the personal 
value of the benefit received, the benefactor’s intentions and the 
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cost to a benefactor of helping (Froh & Bono 2014, p. 222), is still 
rather one-sided.  So, for example, while such focus may well 
‘tune individuals into seeing the best in other people…’ (Froh & 
Bono, 2014, p. 194), it is far from uncontroversial that we should 
always aim to see the best in others and there may indeed be a 
moral case for encouraging more sober assessment of other folk – 
including their often mixed and/or underhand motives for 
benefaction – warts and all. 
 
Still, notwithstanding the questions we have raised in this paper 
about the moral credentials of gratitude, it may well be that 
discriminating gratitude is a significant interpersonal or pro-social 
attitude or virtue that we rightly value, commend agents for 
exhibiting and criticize them for lacking. Insofar, if assisting 
deeper appreciation of the whys and wherefores of gratitude is a 
precondition of the growth of such virtue, there may be some case 
for sober and disciplined exploration of the grammatical and 
conceptual complexities of gratitude discourse in formal 
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educational contexts (see Arthur et al., 2015). Thus, as in the case 
of mastering the grammar of other human virtues such as honesty, 
justice, temperance, courage or generosity, there might here – in 
the spirit of the contemporary virtue ethicist Alasdair MacIntyre 
(1981) – be a place for exploration of the complexities of gratitude 
through the study of literary narratives and stories in such subjects 
as English, History and Religious Education (see, for example, 
Carr and Harrison, 2015). But given the evident moral and other 
complexities of gratitude as a not unproblematic strand in the warp 
and weave of human association this would, to be sure, need to be 
a critical and discriminating examination. That said, the details of 
such critical gratitude education will need to be addressed 
elsewhere. (Morgan, Gulliford and Carr, 2015)  
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